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Abstract—Approximate computing has recently emerged as
a promising method to meet the low power requirements of
digital designs. The erroneous outputs produced in approximate
computing can be partially a function of each chip’s process
variation. We show that, in such schemes, the erroneous outputs
produced on each chip instance can reveal the identity of the
chip that performed the computation, possibly jeopardizing user
privacy. In this work, we perform simulation experiments on
32-bit Ripple Carry Adders, Carry Lookahead Adders, and
Han-Carlson Adders running at over-scaled operating points.
Our results show that identification is possible, we contrast
the identifiability of each type of adder, and we quantify how
success of identification varies with the extent of over-scaling and
noise. Our results are the first to show that approximate digital
computations may compromise privacy. Designers of future
approximate computing systems should be aware of the possible
privacy leakages and decide whether mitigation is warranted in
their application.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the growing need for energy efficient designs
and the emergence of error-tolerant application domains has
prompted significant research interest in the area of approximate
computing. The basic concept of approximate computing is
simple: For many applications such as DSP, data mining and
multimedia (audio, video, graphics), a perfect result is usually
not necessary. In other words, these classes of applications
can tolerate some amount of error. The relaxation of accuracy
introduces an amount of design space freedom that can be
exploited to reduce power consumption or increase performance.
With predictions of increasing adoption of approximate com-
puting systems in the coming years, designers of approximate
computing systems should start considering the associated
privacy risks and whether they warrant mitigation.
In this work, we consider how approximate computing can
compromise privacy of a device or of a device-bearer. We
assume that an adversary can apply chosen operands to the
processor and observe computed, and possibly identifying
erronous results.
Contributions: The specific contributions we make in the
paper are as follows:
• We show, for the first time, that results from overscaled
approximate computations can reveal the identity of the
chip that performed the computation.
• We compare and contrast the identifying ability of the
outputs of three popular styles of 32-bit adders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II provides related work on approximate computing
to give context to our contribution. Section III explains
how approximate computational results can reveal device
identity. Section IV addresses methodology. Section V presents
simulation results showing how privacy leakage varies with
design and clock frequency. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Approximate circuits exploit the potential error resilience
of some classes of applications. This error resilience can have
different reasons: a) the data is coming from the real world
and therefore, is noisy by nature, b) the algorithm used is
self-healing and can attenuate an amount of error, or c) the
user of these applications is able to tolerate an amount of
error in the result [18]. One method of approximate computing
is to use deterministic functional approximation, in which a
particular Boolean function is replaced by a simpler one that
produces similar results at lower complexity [7, 8]. Because
functional approximations compute identical results across all
chips, they pose no risk to privacy.
The computational circuits that are of interest in this work
are circuits that use non-deterministic approximations, or what
are sometimes denoted timing-based approximations [19]. In
these approaches, a design is voltage overscaled or frequency
overscaled to an operating point where timing constraints may
be violated by some circuit paths. At overscaled operating
points, the output of a circuit depends not only on inputs, but
also on process variation.
Many of the efforts toward approximate computing have
focused on adders as ubiquitous basic components of digital
systems (e.g. [5, 7, 8, 10, 13], among others). More specifically,
there has been a lot of research that targets ripple carry adders
(RCAs) as an approximate adder of choice because RCAs have
a few long paths in the carry chain that are rarely sensitized [10],
and this enables a gradual degradation of quality of results
when overscaled. For example, the authors in [13] have targeted
RCAs to reduce the error rate within a fixed energy budget
and the authors in [5] proposed a biased voltage scaling for
probabilistic RCAs that scales the operating voltage according
to the significance of bits. Because of the focus on adders in
previous approximate computing research, we focus our study
on adders as well.
Aside from computational blocks in general and adders
specifically, there has also been significant interest in approxi-
mate memories. Previous works have proposed DRAM-based
approximate memories [14] with unsafe refresh intervals to save
energy, fast but inaccurate writes to multi-level non-volatile
storage cells [16], and voltage overscaled SRAM [3]. Recently,
one paper has showed that data stored in approximate DRAM
can be used as a fingerprint to reveal device identity [15]. To the
best of our knowledge, this one previous paper is the only work
to explore privacy issues in approximate computing systems,
and no previous works at all have studied privacy leakages
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on the computational (i.e. non-memory) side of approximate
computing.
The use of process variations to identify devices is similar
to the idea of a physical unclonable function (PUF) in security.
PUFs are circuits designed to extract identifying fingerprints
from process variations via timing variations [4] or power-up
states of SRAM [6, 11].
III. IDENTIFICATION FROM OVERSCALING
Overscaling-based approximate computing relaxes clock
period constraints and allows that the long combinational paths
of a circuit may not fully propagate within the clock period.
In this case, the register at the end of the path may capture
intermediate (wrong) results on the clock edge. Because of
process variation, the critical paths of different chips will
have different delays. For example, recent works report 12%
frequency variation at 1.1V in 45nm technology [17] and 30%
for sub-90nm technologies [2]. The variable path delays will
cause different erroneous outputs in approximate computation.
Example: We now give a concrete example to show how
gate delays can lead to different results at overscaled operating
points. Fig. 1 shows an example 8-bit ripple carry adder that
has two 8-bit input signals {a7 . . . a0} and {b7 . . . b0}, and a 9-
bit output signal {couts7 . . . s0}. If {a7 . . . a0} = 8′b11111111
and {b7 . . . b0} = 8′b00000001, a carry signal has to propagate
all the way from FA0 to FA7 in order to generate the correct
result. We now focus on what occurs after the carry has
propagated through the first seven full adders and signal c7
rises on the input to FA7. Letting the delay of gate i in FA7
(see Fig. 1) be denoted di, when the value of c7 rises, the
output s7 will fall after time d2. The critical path to cout goes
through gates 3 and 5. Therefore, it takes d3 + d5 from the
time c7 changes for cout to rise.
The value captured on cout and s7 will depend on the delays
of the gate instances. In the presence of process variation, some
gates might be faster or slower on one chip than another. If
all gates are slow relative to the clock period, then the rising
transition on c7 may propagate to neither cout nor s7 before
the clock edge, and the output will be couts7 = 01. If gates 2,3,
and 5 are all fast, then the correct value of couts7 = 10 will be
captured on the clock edge; this is depicted in Fig. 2a. If gate
2 is slow, and gates 3 and 5 are fast, then output s7 will not
have fallen before the capturing clock edge, and the captured
value will be couts7 = 11 (Fig. 2b). If gate 2 is fast and gate
3 or 5 is slow, then output s7 will have fallen but cout will not
have risen, and the captured output value will be couts7 = 00
(Fig. 2c). This example shows that variations in gate delays can
lead to different erroneous outputs in approximate computing;
this is the reason that overscaled approximate computing may
lead to device identifiability.
Entropy of Input Vectors: Note that for the above example,
we only considered a portion of a small circuit. For a large
circuit, each individual gate has different delays and many
different output results can be generated for some inputs.
A good input vector for identification is able to distinguish
different chips with different path delays caused by process
variation. When applying random input vectors to a circuit the
majority of vectors will not sensitize long paths and therefore
will produce deterministic error-free outputs. To distinguish
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Fig. 1: An 8-bit ripple carry adder with full-adder blocks.
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Fig. 2: Timing diagram for FA7 of the ripple carry adder
depicted in Fig. 1
the useful vectors from non-useful vectors, we use metric of
conditional entropy. When an input vector aj is applied across
a large number of devices at a particular operating point, let
the probability of observing output xi be denoted Pr(xi|aj).
The entropy associated with the result to input aj is given
by equation 1. The input vectors with high entropy may be
specific to the style of adder and operating point. Although
entropy can be estimated from the outputs of adders when
viewed as a black box, the entropy associated with different
inputs to each adder type implicitly depends on the distribution
of path lengths and the path diversity inside of the adder.
H(X|aj) = −
∑
i
Pr(xi|aj)log2Pr(xi|aj) (1)
If an input vector has high entropy on a particular style of
adder, it will induce different results for many of the considered
chips. However in practice, an input vector usually produces the
same results for many chips. Furthermore, noise can diminish
the usefulness of high-entropy inputs. Nonetheless, entropy is
a useful metric that can provide insights about the identifying
ability of each adder, as will be discussed in Sec. V-A.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We considere three different 32-bit adders for our evaluations:
ripple carry adder (RCA), carry lookahead adder (CLA) and
Han-Carlson adder (HCA) [9]. Because our experiments require
simulating a large number of vectors on large populations of
32-bit adder circuit instances, using HSPICE simulation alone
was found to be impractical in terms of simulation time. Instead,
we use HSPICE simulation to extract gate delays and then
use timed Verilog simulation with the extracted gate delays to
simulate the overall 32-bit circuit. The gate models in HSPICE
are 45nm CMOS Predictive Technology Model [1] (PTM)
minimum-sized transistors at voltage of 1.0V. Monte-Carlo
simulation is performed 100 times across process variations
on Vth to provide a realistic distribution of pin-to-pin gate
delays for each gate type. When creating an instance of the
overall adder circuit, we randomly select gate delay instances
from the pre-characterized distributions of each gate type. The
timed Verilog models of the adders are simulated using Icarus
Verilog (iVerilog).
Changing voltage and changing clock period are two different
ways of affecting the same amount of overscaling. In our
experiments, we control overscaling by changing the clock
period while keeping a set of gate delays extracted at one
voltage. We choose this approach because it allows us to dial
in a target error rate by performing a binary search on the clock
period until hitting the desired error rate. We make comparisons
across the different styles of 32-bit adders by choosing a clock
period for each adder style that realizes equivalent rates of
erroneous output. For our 32-bit adders, the clock periods that
yield 1%, 2% and 5% erroneous outputs are shown in Tab. I.
Note that going from 5% error to 1% error in an RCA requires
increasing the clock period by 127 ps, whereas both CLA and
HCA require only a 20 ps increase for the same change in
error. This occurs because the RCA has many infrequently
sensitized long carry chain paths, whereas HCA is a tree adder
with many near-critical paths.
To represent non-idealities in our timing model and to
evaluate the robustness of identification, we introduce random
noise to our simulations. Each time noise is added to a gate,
it is drawn from a normal distribution with 0 mean and
standard deviation equal to 10% of the nominal delay. Noise
is uncorrelated across gates, and across vectors, meaning that
for each new vector applied to a circuit, the noise offsets are
replaced by new values.
TABLE I: Clock period used for each adder type to achieve
desired error rate.
RCA CLA HCA
1% error 653 ps 345 ps 355 ps
2% error 624 ps 340 ps 349 ps
5% error 526 ps 325 ps 335 ps
V. EVALUATION
We perform a set of experiments to study the extent to which
instances of each adder type can be identified by their outputs.
We use these experiments to compare the identifiability of the
different adder styles, and the impact of noise.
A. Measuring the Entropy of Vectors
The first step toward practical chip identification is to pick
high entropy vectors. We set the clock period for each adder
style to achieve a 1% error rate and simulate 200,000 random
input vectors on 50 instances of RCAs, CLAs and HCAs. We
calculate the entropy of each applied vector according to Eq. 1.
The average entropy for RCA, CLA and HCA are 0.01227,
0.01187 and 0.03260, respectively. In the RCA, 97.78% of all
input vectors induce the same result on all 50 chips, while in
the HCA, the same number is only 90.73%. This is because
in an RCA, a much higher percentage of vectors cause errors
on no chips, or in other words sensitize no paths with delay
comparable to or exceeding the clock period. On the other hand,
an HCA, which is a tree adder, tends to have a variety of paths
with similar nominal delays, and a much lower percentage of
vectors are error-free across all chips at the chosen clock period.
Another view of this result is as follows: when considering for
each adder type the set of random vectors that caused an error
on one or more of the 50 instances, we find that each such
vector causes errors in about 71% of RCA chips, versus only
24% for CLA and 10% for HCA adders. If each adder type is
operated at the same error rate, the error-causing input vectors
will be less unique on the RCA. Note however, that non-unique
input vectors does not mean that the output vectors are less
unique to each chip; instead, it only means that the inputs that
induce the erroneous outputs are less unique to each chip.
B. Identification Results
Next we explore identification of chip instances using their
outputs. For this experiment, we simulate 40,000 vectors on 50
instances of each adder type operating at their respective clock
periods for 1% error (Tab. I). To measure similarity or lack of
similarity between the outputs produced, we use a metric of
Matching Distance. The matching distance for any two adders
of the same type is the number of outputs that differ when the
same (40,000) input vectors are applied. The histograms of
between-class and within-class matching distances are shown
in Fig. 3. The within-class bars correspond to the matching
distance of two trials of the same chip in the presence of
noise (see Sec. IV), and the between-class bars correspond
to pairings of two different chips. When between-class and
within-class overlap less, then one can better tell whether two
sets of outputs are from the same chip, and can therefore better
identify a chip. A chip can always be identified using some
matching distance as a decision threshold if the between-class
and within-class distances are non-overlapping.
ROC Curve: A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve is used to measure the performance of chip identification.
Each point of an ROC curve corresponds to a single decision
threshold and depicts the trade-off between true positives and
false positives at that decision threshold. In an ideal case where
between-class and within-class distances are separable, the ROC
curve will be a step function [12], as this would indicate that
there exists some decision threshold that can correctly identify
all true positives (within-class pairings) without accepting any
false positives (between-class pairings). Fig. 4 shows the ROC
curve for the three adder styles; the RCA is easily the most
identifiable of the three adder styles in this case.
C. Impact of Error Rate
There is usually a trade-off between the amount of errors
in the outputs and the power/performance improvement in
the system. While accepting a higher error rate can be more
attractive for efficiency, our results show that a higher error
rate can increase identifiability of a circuit. In this experiment
we set the clock period such that an average error rate of 1%,
2% and 5% are seen on the output results. The results of this
experiment are shown in Fig. 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered, for the first time, the possible pri-
vacy implications of voltage-overscaled or frequency-overscaled
approximate computations. We perform a large simulation study
on three types of adders and show that the ability to provide
inputs to a computation unit and observe corresponding outputs
(a) Matching distance of ripple carry adder
(b) Matching distance of carry lookahead adder
(c) Matching distance of Han-Carlson adder
Fig. 3: Matching distance based on outputs produced for 40,000
random input vectors for each adder type.
Fig. 4: ROC curve of three adders when 40,000 vectors are
simulated on 50 instances of each adder using a clock period
for 1% error rate. The AUCs for RCA, CLA, and HCA are
0.99, 0.89 and 0.81 respectively.
(a) ROC of RCA (b) ROC of CLA (c) ROC of HCA
Fig. 5: ROC curve of each adder type at different error rates
can reveal the identity of the approximate computing device
that performed the computation. This is a possible privacy risk
that designers of future approximate computing systems should
consider when evaluating application scenarios.
Acknowledgement: This work has been supported by a
grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under award
CNS-1563829 and by University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
REFERENCES
[1] Predictive Technology Model. http://ptm.asu.edu/.
[2] BORKAR, S., KARNIK, T., NARENDRA, S., TSCHANZ, J., KESHAVARZI,
A., AND DE, V. Parameter variations and impact on circuits and
microarchitecture. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual Design Automation
Conference (2003), DAC ’03, pp. 338–342.
[3] ESMAEILZADEH, H., SAMPSON, A., CEZE, L., AND BURGER, D.
Architecture support for disciplined approximate programming. In
ASPLOS’12: Architectural Support for Programming Languages and
Operating Systems (Apr. 2012).
[4] GASSEND, B., CLARKE, D., AND VAN DIJK, M. Silicon physical
random functions. In Proceedings of the IEEE Computer and Communi-
cations Society (2002).
[5] GEORGE, J., MARR, B., AKGUL, B. E. S., AND PALEM, K. V.
Probabilistic arithmetic and energy efficient embedded signal processing.
In Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Compilers,
Architecture and Synthesis for Embedded Systems (New York, NY, USA,
2006), CASES ’06, ACM, pp. 158–168.
[6] GUAJARDO, J., KUMAR, S., SCHRIJEN, G., AND TUYLS, P. FPGA
intrinsic PUFs and their use for IP protection. Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems (2007).
[7] GUPTA, V., MOHAPATRA, D., PARK, S. P., RAGHUNATHAN, A., AND
ROY, K. Impact: imprecise adders for low-power approximate computing.
In Proceedings of the 17th international symposium on Low-power
electronics and design (2011), pp. 409–414.
[8] GUPTA, V., MOHAPATRA, D., RAGHUNATHAN, A., AND ROY, K. Low-
power digital signal processing using approximate adders. Computer-
Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, IEEE Transactions on
32, 1 (Jan 2013), 124–137.
[9] HAN, T., AND CARLSON, D. A. Fast area-efficient vlsi adders. In
Computer Arithmetic (ARITH), 1987 IEEE 8th Symposium on (May
1987), pp. 49–56.
[10] HEGDE, R., AND SHANBHAG, N. R. Soft Digital Signal Processing.
IEEE Transaction on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems (2001).
[11] HOLCOMB, D. E., BURLESON, W. P., AND FU, K. Power-up SRAM
state as an identifying fingerprint and source of true random numbers.
IEEE Transactions on Computers 58, 9 (Sept. 2009), 1198–1210.
[12] JAIN, A. K., PRABHAKAR, S., AND CHEN, S. Combining multiple
matchers for a high security fingerprint verification system. Pattern
Recognition Letters 20, 11-13 (1999), 1371 – 1379.
[13] KEDEM, Z. M., MOONEY, V. J., MUNTIMADUGU, K. K., AND PALEM,
K. V. An approach to energy-error tradeoffs in approximate ripple carry
adders. In Proceedings of the 17th IEEE/ACM international symposium
on Low-power electronics and design (2011), pp. 211–216.
[14] LIU, S., PATTABIRAMAN, K., MOSCIBRODA, T., AND ZORN, B. G.
Flikker: saving DRAM refresh-power through critical data partitioning.
In Architectural support for programming languages and operating
systems (June 2011).
[15] RAHMATI, A., HICKS, M., HOLCOMB, D. E., AND FU, K. Probable
cause: The deanonymizing effects of approximate DRAM. In Proceedings
of the 42nd Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
(New York, NY, USA, 2015), ISCA ’15, ACM, pp. 604–615.
[16] SAMPSON, A., NELSON, J., STRAUSS, K., AND CEZE, L. Approximate
Storage in Solid-State Memories. IEEE Micro (2013).
[17] TAVANA, M. K., KULKARNI, A., RAHIMI, A., MOHSENIN, T., AND
HOMAYOUN, H. Energy-efficient mapping of biomedical applications
on domain-specific accelerator under process variation. In Low Power
Electronics and Design (ISLPED), 2014 International Symposium on
(Aug 2014), pp. 275–278.
[18] VENKATARAMANI, S., CHIPPA, V. K., CHAKRADHAR, S. T., ROY,
K., AND RAGHUNATHAN, A. Quality programmable vector processors
for approximate computing. In Proceedings of the 46th International
Symposium on Microarchitecture (2013), MICRO-46, pp. 1–12.
[19] VENKATESAN, R., AGARWAL, A., ROY, K., AND RAGHUNATHAN, A.
MACACO: Modeling and analysis of circuits for approximate computing.
In International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD) (2011),
pp. 667–673.
